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Soleimany H, Mehrdad A, Sadeghi S, Moazemi F. Novel Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis of Zorro Block Cipher. JSDP 2020; 16 (4) :17-26
URL: http://jsdp.rcisp.ac.ir/article-1-842-en.html

Impossible difference attack is a powerful tool for evaluating the security of block ciphers based on finding a differential characteristic with the probability of exactly zero. The linear layer diffusion rate of a cipher plays a fundamental role in the security of the algorithm against the impossible difference attack. In this paper, we show an efficient method, which is independent of the quality of the linear layer, can find impossible differential characteristics of Zorro block cipher. In other words, using the proposed method, we show that, independent of the linear layer feature and other internal elements of the algorithm, it is possible to achieve effective impossible differential characteristic for the 9-round Zorro algorithm. Also, based on represented 9-round impossible differential characteristic, we provide a key recovery attack on reduced 10-round Zorro algorithm. In this paper, we propose a robust and different method to find impossible difference characteristics for Zorro cipher, which is independent of the linear layer of the algorithm. The main observation in this method is that the number of possible differences in that which may occur in the middle of Zorro algorithm might be very limited. This is due to the different structure of Zorro. We show how this attribute can be used to construct impossible difference characteristics. Then, using the described method, we show that, independent of the features of the algorithm elements, it is possible to achieve efficient 9-round impossible differential characteristics of Zorro cipher. It is important to note that the best impossible differential characteristics of the AES encryption algorithm are only practicable for four rounds. So the best impossible differential characteristic of Zorro cipher is far more than the best characteristic of AES, while both algorithms use an equal linear layer. Also, the analysis presented in the article, in contrast to previous analyzes, can be applied to all ciphers with the same structure as Zorro, because our analysis is independent of the internal components of the algorithm. In particular, the method presented in this paper shows that for all Zorro modified versions, there are similarly impossible differential characteristics. Zorro cipher is a block cipher algorithm with 128-bit block size and 128-bit key size. Zorro consists of 6 different sections, each with 4 rounds (24 rounds in all). Zorro does not have any subkey production algorithm and the main key is simply added to the value of the beginning state of each section using the XOR operator. Internal rounds of one section do not use the key. Similar to AES, Zorro state matrix can be shown by a 4 × 4 matrix, which each of these 16 components represent one byte. One round of Zorro, consists of four functions, which are SB*, AC, SR, and MC, respectively. The SB* function is a nonlinear function applying only to the four bytes in the first row of the state matrix. Therefore, in the opposite of the AES, where the substitution box is applied to all bytes, the Zorro substitution box only applies to four bytes. The AC operator is to add a round constant. Finally, the two SR and MC transforms are applied to the state matrix, which is, respectively, the shift row and mixed column used in the AES standard algorithm. Since the analyzes presented in this article are independent of the substitution properties, we do not use the S-box definition used by Zorro. Our proposed model uses this Zorro property that the number of possible differences after limited rounds can be much less than the total number of possible differences. In this paper, we introduce features of the Zorro, which can provide a high bound for the number of possible values of an intermediate difference. We will then present a model for how to find Zorro impossible differential characteristics, based on the limitations of the intermediate differences and using the miss-in-the-middle attack. Finally, we show that based on the proposed method, it is possible to find an impossible differential characteristic for 9 rounds of algorithms with a Zorro-like structure and regardless of the linear layer properties. Also, it is possible to apply the key recovery attack on 10 rounds of the algorithm. So, regardless of the features of the used elements, it can be shown that this number of round of algorithms is not secure even by changing the linear layer.